Patients with end-stage renal disease experience significant mortality and morbidity, including cognitive decline. Advance care planning has been emphasized as a responsibility and priority of physicians caring for patients with chronic kidney disease in order to align with patient values before decision-making capacity is lost and to avoid suffering. This emphasis has proven ineffective, as illustrated in the case of a patient treated in our hospital. Is this ineffectiveness a consequence of failure in the courtroom or the clinic? Through our (...) own experience we affirm what has been written before: that legal precedent favors intensive treatment in virtually all cases without ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a patient’s previously declared wishes to the contrary. Equally clear is that more than 20 years of support in the clinical literature suggesting advance care planning early in the course of disease can address challenges in the legal system for those lacking capacity. However, many physicians fail t... (shrink)

Occupational fraud frequently involves the direct or indirect participation of professional accountants. To reduce fraud, companies often focus on the incentive/pressure and opportunity legs of the fraud triangle, perhaps believing that rationalization is beyond their control. We argue that rationalization reduction is necessary to minimize occupational fraud. We propose that educators and PA consider incorporating fences as controls to reduce rationalization. Because they focus on compliance and risk avoidance and are non-negotiable, fences appeal to accountant’s Myers Briggs personalities and conventional (...) level of moral development. Educators can teach students about the fences used in practice, and explain how they help new professionals resist pressures and temptations. By adding fences to existing professional guidance, accountants can reduce the likelihood that they will be a party to fraud. (shrink)

First published in 1975, this is a book of general intellectual interest about the role of the university in contemporary society and that of university teachers in relation to their subjects, their students, and their wider political commitments. Alan Montefiore offers preliminary analyses of the family of concepts most often invoked in discussions of these problems, taking the central dispute to be between those who hold a 'liberal' view of the university and those who regard this notion as illusory, (...) dishonest or undesirable. Six academics, representing, discuss issues of substantive conflict in light of Montefiore's initial distinctions. The volume is of particular interest to students of political and social philosophy, and political and educational theory. It is also intended for a wider readership among those who care about the political status of the universities and recognize the importance and difficulty of the problems involved in this. (shrink)

Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods, or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number (...) of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures. (shrink)

Let κ denote a regular uncountable cardinal and NS the normal ideal of nonstationary subsets of κ. Our results concern the well-known open question whether NS fails to be κ + -saturated, i.e., are there κ + stationary subsets of κ with pairwise intersections nonstationary? Our first observation is: Theorem. NS is κ + -saturated iff for every normal ideal J on κ there is a stationary set $A \subseteq \kappa$ such that $J = NS \mid A = \{X \subseteq (...) \kappa:X \cap A \in NS\}$ . Turning our attention to large cardinals, we extend the usual (weak) Mahlo hierarchy to define "greatly Mahlo" cardinals and obtain the following: Theorem. If κ is greatly Mahlo then NS is not κ + -saturated. Theorem. If κ is ordinal Π 1 1 -indescribable (e.g., weakly compact), ethereal (e.g., subtle), or carries a κ-saturated ideal, then κ is greatly Mahlo. Moreover, there is a stationary set of greatly Mahlo cardinals below any ordinal Π 1 1 -indescribable cardinal. These methods apply to other normal ideals as well; e.g., the subtle ideal on an ineffable cardinal κ is not κ + -saturated. (shrink)

Let AC and AI denote the collections of graphs with vertex set ω and which have, respectively, no infinite independent subgraph, and no infinite complete subgraph. Both AC and AI are coanalytic sets of reals that are not analytic, and they are disjoint by Ramsey’s theorem. We prove that there exists a Borel set separating AC and AI, and we discuss the sense in which this is an infinite analogue of a weak version of.

It appears that both English and French contain a mixture of ergative and transitive verbal constructions. How useful is reference to a dual-structure model of syntax in determining the bias of a particular language? Certain verbal constructions in English and French could be generated from either transitive or ergative deep structures; we must therefore turn to other criteria - syntactic cohesion and predominant constituent structures in 'surface structure' - for a non-arbitrary - and adequate - decision.

To his credit, Chomsky puts them all on his website, whether it’s The New Yorker describing him as “the devil’s accountant†and “one of the greatest minds of the 20th centuryâ€, or The Nation, which lampooned him as “a very familiar kind of academic hack†whose career has been “the product of a combination of self-promotion, abuse of detractors, and the fudging of his findingsâ€. He stands accused of asserting that every US President since Franklin D Roosevelt should have been (...) impeached as war criminals; of supporting the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia; and of comparing Israel to the Third Reich. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

Nietzsche's use of metaphor has been widely noted but rarely focused to explore specific images in great detail. A Nietzschean Bestiary gathers essays devoted to the most notorious and celebrated beasts in Nietzsche's work. The essays illustrate Nietzsche's ample use of animal imagery, and link it to the dual philosophical purposes of recovering and revivifying human animality, which plays a significant role in his call for de-deifying nature.

Impairments in emotional face processing are demonstrated by individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, which is associated with altered emotion processing networks. Despite accumulating evidence of high rates of diagnostic overlap and shared symptoms between ASD and ADHD, functional connectivity underpinning emotion processing across these two neurodevelopmental disorders, compared to typical developing peers, has rarely been examined. The current study used magnetoencephalography to investigate whole-brain functional connectivity during the presentation of happy and angry faces in (...) 258 children, including ASD, ADHD and typically developing groups to determine possible differences in emotion processing. Data-driven clustering was also applied to determine whether the patterns of connectivity differed among diagnostic groups. We found reduced functional connectivity in the beta band in ASD compared to TD, and a further reduction in the ADHD group compared to the ASD and the TD groups, across emotions. A group-by-emotion interaction in the gamma frequency band was also observed. Greater connectivity to happy compared to angry faces was found in the ADHD and TD groups, while the opposite pattern was seen in ASD. Data-driven subgrouping identified two distinct subgroups: NDD-dominant and TD-dominant; these subgroups demonstrated emotion- and frequency-specific differences in connectivity. Atypicalities in specific brain networks were strongly correlated with the severity of diagnosis-specific symptoms. Functional connectivity strength in the beta network was negatively correlated with difficulties in attention; in the gamma network, functional connectivity strength to happy faces was positively correlated with adaptive behavioural functioning, but in contrast, negatively correlated to angry faces. Our findings establish atypical frequency- and emotion-specific patterns of functional connectivity between NDD and TD children. Data-driven clustering further highlights a high degree of comorbidity and symptom overlap between the ASD and ADHD children. (shrink)

Reviews of Peter Dear's Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution.

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1996. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Diagnostic self-testing devices are being developed for many illnesses, chronic diseases and infections. These will be used in hospitals, at point-of-care facilities and at home. Designed to allow earlier detection of diseases, self-testing diagnostic devices may improve disease prevention, slow the progression of disease and facilitate better treatment outcomes. These devices have the potential to benefit both the individual and society by enabling individuals to take a more proactive role in the maintenance of their health and by helping society improve (...) health and reduce health costs. However, the full implications of future home-based diagnostic technology for individuals and society remain unclear due to their novelty. We argue that the development of diagnostic tools, especially for home use, will heighten a number of ethical challenges. This paper will explore some of the ethical implications of home-based self-testing diagnostic devices for the autonomous and relational dimensions of the person. This will be facilitated by examining the impact of diagnostic devices for individual autonomy, for the delivery of accurate diagnosis and for the personal significance of the information for the user. The latter will be examined using Charles Taylor's view of personhood and his emphasis on human agency and interpretation. While the ethical issues are not necessarily new, the development of home-based self-testing diagnostic devices will make issues regarding autonomy, accuracy of information and personal significance more and more demanding. This will be the case particularly when an individual's autonomous choices come into conflict with the person's relational responsibilities. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDiagnostic self‐testing devices are being developed for many illnesses, chronic diseases and infections. These will be used in hospitals, at point‐of‐care facilities and at home. Designed to allow earlier detection of diseases, self‐testing diagnostic devices may improve disease prevention, slow the progression of disease and facilitate better treatment outcomes. These devices have the potential to benefit both the individual and society by enabling individuals to take a more proactive role in the maintenance of their health and by helping society improve (...) health and reduce health costs. However, the full implications of future home‐based diagnostic technology for individuals and society remain unclear due to their novelty.We argue that the development of diagnostic tools, especially for home use, will heighten a number of ethical challenges. This paper will explore some of the ethical implications of home‐based self‐testing diagnostic devices for the autonomous and relational dimensions of the person. This will be facilitated by examining the impact of diagnostic devices for individual autonomy, for the delivery of accurate diagnosis and for the personal significance of the information for the user. The latter will be examined using Charles Taylor's view of personhood and his emphasis on human agency and interpretation.While the ethical issues are not necessarily new, the development of home‐based self‐testing diagnostic devices will make issues regarding autonomy, accuracy of information and personal significance more and more demanding. This will be the case particularly when an individual's autonomous choices come into conflict with the person's relational responsibilities. (shrink)

The political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is presented as uniquely able to solve the problems of modern political theory. In the face of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, a legitimate liberal state can legislate solely on the basis of a modular conception of justice affirmed from within each reasonable conception. However, it is argued that this view, while restrictive, has to permit the promotion of its own pre-conditions. This demanding duty of civic restraint requires citizens (...) who have been educated for citizen virtue in the context of associational life in civil society. This challenge to expand liberalism to cover its own preconditions at the level of a moral background culture, has usually been levelled by one kind of republican/communitarian (Charles Taylor) or so-called "ethical liberals". It can be met by the adoption of a liberal republicanism that operates within the constraints of Rawls' political liberalism but nevertheless explains and justifies why such a view must treat traditional republican themes such as active citizenship and the importance of associational life. The solution lies in treating these values as option values, in a sense that is explained. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 542-543 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy Stephen Gaukroger. Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 249. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $21.95. In Stephen Gaukroger's new study, Francis Bacon is lauded all too familiarly as the inaugurator of "the transformation of philosophy into science, (...) and philosophers into scientists" (221). But it's far from the old story: Gaukroger sees Bacon not as progenitor of the Scientific Revolution or revered Father of Modern Science, but as launching "the first systematic, comprehensive attempt to transform the early-modern philosopher from someone whose primary concern is with how to live morally into someone whose primary concern is with the understanding of and reshaping of natural processes" (5).In Gaukroger's account, Bacon had a definite objective: to draw certain knowledge away from its status as esoteric and arcane (held by, say, the trade guilds or the universities), and to bring it into the public realm, an agenda that raised the question not of knowledge per se, but of "the aims of knowledge" (16). Pointing to Bacon's education in statecraft and his almost lifelong immersion in law and politics, Gaukroger argues—here following the work of Julian Martin—that the law was of intellectual interest because "the law was really as close as one got to a model for inquiry and argument" (59); and, moreover, that legal reasoning, like Bacon's conception of natural philosophy, "has a very practical imperative": to discover the truth (60). Although the features of the legal model could be applied to natural philosophy—"the reliability of testimony, what should be concluded from particular testimonies, and how one decided the relevance of particular laws to the case" (61)—Gaukroger wisely registers the caveat that one model cannot simply be mapped onto another, since natural philosophy "needs to be legitimated as an area of activity that it is proper and fruitful to pursue" (67). This project occupies chapter 3. In his famous announcement that he was taking "all knowledge to be my province," Bacon wrote of his need to purge that province "of two sorts of rovers." Gaukroger identifies these as the Scholastic tradition and the "natural magic" practiced by John Dee and Edward Kelley, and plots the genealogy of Bacon's efforts to separate natural philosophy from what he calls "the blind and immoderate zeal of religion." Thus, even though Bacon undertakes "a quite conservative classification" of knowledge in Advancement of Learning and De augmentis, Gaukroger claims that he "incorporates a radical claim for the autonomy of natural philosophy" (94). Chapter 4 moves on to the man himself, "the shaping of the natural philosopher," and includes convincing readings of two under-read but important texts, the polemical Temporis partus masculus (1602) and Redargutio philosophiarum (1608), which between them demonstrate "a novel and powerful doctrine" being advocated by Bacon (110), founded in an appreciation of the historicization of knowledge. Gaukroger also airs an intriguing but too brief speculative comparison between Bacon's famous academic community in "Solomon's House" and an actual educated, motivated elite society of the period—Loyola's Society of Jesus.The final two chapters are more demanding. Chapter 5 interrogates the complex relationship between Bacon's substantive natural philosophy and his method. Gaukroger takes issue with Antonio Pérez-Ramos's influential notion that Bacon tacitly employs a "maker's knowledge conception," where knowing something and being able to make that thing "are effectively the same," arguing instead that "what is at stake" in Bacon "seems quite different." Whereas the maker's knowledge principle is concerned with "the degree of certainty of results in natural philosophy," Bacon is more interested "in making natural philosophy informative and productive" (159). Despite Bacon's call for large-scale communal intellectual endeavour, Gaukroger concludes that Bacon never approached any of the men included on his 1608 wishlist for collaborators (162). Here he is too pessimistic; recent research is showing... (shrink)

Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, daß (...) sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen..Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, daß sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen. (shrink)

The main burden of this paper is to point up what are considered to be serious shortcomings in Barrow's [1] argument that the ‘philosophically competent’ head should control a school's curriculum policy. At the same time, whilst exigencies of space prohibit a comprehensive defence of ‘participatory decision-making’ and its pertinence for schools [2], it will be argued that curriculum policy is best controlled by governing bodies of the type proposed by the Taylor Committee [3], given, of course, that such (...) bodies must operate within a framework of national and local authority policy. (shrink)

Reductive explanations are psychologically seductive; when given two explanations, people prefer the one that refers to lower-level components or processes to account for the phenomena under consideration even when information about these lower levels is irrelevant (Hopkins, Weisberg, and Taylor 2016). Maybe individuals assume that a reductive explanation is what a scientific explanation should look like (e.g., neuroscience should explain psychology) or presume that information about lower-level components or processes is more explanatory (e.g., molecular detail explains better than anatomical (...) detail). Philosophers have been analyzing reduction for more than half a century (Hüttemann and Love 2016), but neither of these possibilities is a consensus view (even if psychologically applicable). Instead, there is widespread agreement that the landscape of reductionism is complicated, especially in biology (Brigandt and Love 2017). Increasing scrutiny of actual practices within biology and other sciences has often provoked the questions (paraphrasing Alasdair MacIntyre): Whose explanation? Which reductionism? Marie Kaiser’s book—Reductive Explanation in the Biological Sciences—is a decisive intervention into these discussions, offering a wealth of helpful distinctions and new analyses with a healthy focus on scientific practices of explanation. (shrink)

Leo Strauss's readings of historical figures in the philosophical tradition have been justly well explored; however, his relation to contemporary thinkers has not enjoyed the same coverage. In Leo Strauss and Contemporary Thought, an international group of scholars examines the possible conversations between Strauss and figures such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, and Hans Blumenberg. The contributors examine topics including religious liberty, the political function of comedy, law, and the relation between the Ancients and the (...) Moderns, and bring Strauss into many new and original discussions that will be of use to those interested in the thought of Strauss, the history of philosophy and political theory, and contemporary continental thought"--Back cover. (shrink)

First Published in 1996. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the incidents (...) (or components) of self-ownership, with liberals arguing for a narrow definition of the concept and libertarians arguing for a broad one. By using what Alan Ryan has called the “language of proprietorship,” I pinpoint precisely the source of the disagreement between liberals and libertarians and assess the relative strengths of their arguments. I also show that the respective definitions of self-ownership used by liberals and libertarians are deeply problematic—though for strikingly different reasons. (shrink)

Contemporary analytic aestheticians have little interest in the old paradigm of expression theory. They observe that expression theorists tend to locate the essence of art in the externalization of emotion, and they argue persuasively that this tendency is unfortunate. Then they consign expression theorists like Dewey; Collingwood, and Croce to the dustbin of history. This dismissive posture has become standard in aesthetics, for some good reasons. But at least in the case of Dewey, the reasons don't apply. The burden of (...) my dissertation is to make a case for this claim. ;While Dewey does help himself to the vocabulary of expressionism in Art as Experience, he uses it to make arguments less appropriate to a fin-de-siecle expression theorist than to a contemporary cultural critic. He never claims that art is essentially the expression of emotion; he doesn't even agree that emotion is what's expressed in art. His account of expression in art is about the production and reproduction of culture by means of individual agency. It is what Charles Taylor calls expressivism, not expressionism. ;My interpretation of Dewey's aesthetics diverges radically from the one in Alan Tormey's The Concept of Expression, which has become a kind of controlling precedent for the analytic approach to expressionism. I avoid and reject Tormey's reading by locating Dewey's musings on expression in the broader contexts of his conception of the aesthetic, his pragmatist philosophical system, and the tradition of expressivist thought that includes Hamann, Herder, Hegel and Marx. Proceeding in this way not only reveals certain motivations and themes that would otherwise remain obscure, but also highlights certain insights that point toward new, more culturally grounded modes of aesthetic theorizing. I try to recover Dewey's work as a step toward this new aesthetics, an approach that I call, following Cornel West, prophetic aesthetics. (shrink)